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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES DIVISION

In re:
David MacMillan and Cynthia Barrett Martin,
Debtor(s)
Attitude Marketing, Inc.
Debtor(s)
Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc.,
Plaintiff(s)
V.
David MacMillan and Cynthia Barrett Martin,

Case No.: 2:16-bk-21559-NB

Chapter:

Case No.: 2:19-bk-10552-NB

Chapter:

(Jointly Administered with 2:16-bk-21559-

NB)

Adv. Pro. No.: 2:17-ap-01229-NB (Jointly Administered with Adv. Pro. No. 2:17-ap-01551-NB)

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING **PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER 11 U.S.C.** § 727(a)(4), (a)(5), AND (a)(6)

Hearing:

Date: November 12, 2019 Time: 2:00 p.m. Place: Courtroom 1545

255 E. Temple Street

Los Angeles, CA 90012

Defendant(s)

For the reasons set forth below, this Court will deny the remaining claims in the pending motion for summary judgment, which seek to deny the chapter 7 discharge of Debtors David MacMillan and Cynthia Martin, pursuant to §§ 727(a)(4), (5), and (6). Definitions and the background of this matter are set forth in this Court's "Memorandum Decision Re Motions For Partial Summary Judgment Filed By (1) Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc. And (2) Chapter 7 Trustee" (the "Interim Memdispo," Wynd-Mac Adv. dkt. 144).

1. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Interim Memdispo denied motions for summary judgment with respect to claims under §§ 727(a)(2) and (3). But, pursuant to the procedures contemplated in the Interim Memdispo, Plaintiff Wyndham filed its second amended complaint ("SAC," adv. dkt. 151) asserting its claims under §§ 727(a)(4), (5) and (6). The parties had already briefed and argued the merits of those claims in connection with Wyndham's motion for partial summary judgment regarding its first amended complaint (the "MSJ," adv. dkt. 98) and, pursuant to the Interim Memdispo and the agreement of the parties at the above-captioned hearing, that briefing and argument have been applied to the SAC, along with additional briefs. See adv. dkt. 152, 157.

2. DISCUSSION

a. Summary Judgment

Each element of summary judgment is analyzed in the Interim Memdispo. Adv. dkt. 144, pp. 4:9-5:10. That analysis is incorporated herein by this reference. As a reminder, however, the rule states:

The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ... [Rule 56(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., incorporated by Rule 7056, Fed. R. Bankr. P. (emphasis added).]

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and disputed issues of material fact remain, and, when viewing the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the movant is entitled to prevail as a

matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Matsushita Elec.

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Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

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b. § 727(a)(5)

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§ 727(a)(5) provides:

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(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, <u>unless</u> –

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(5) the debtor has <u>failed to explain satisfactorily</u>, before determination of denial of discharge under this paragraph, <u>any loss of assets or deficiency of assets</u> to meet the debtor's liabilities; ... [§ 727(a)(5) (emphasis added)]

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Intent is not a required element under Section 727(a)(5). See 6 Collier on

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Bankruptcy ¶727.08 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).

The party objecting to discharge "bear[s] the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence" that debtors' discharge should be denied. Id. at 1196. It

is then up to the debtor to satisfactorily explain what happened to the assets. 6 Collier

on Bankruptcy ¶727.08 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). "[V]ague,

indefinite, and uncorroborated explanations are unsatisfactory." In re Thompson, 2009

WL 7751298 at *5 (9th Cir. BAP 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);

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Under Section 727(a)(5) an objecting party bears the initial burden of proof and must demonstrate: (1) debtor at one time, not too remote from the bankruptcy petition date, owned identifiable assets; (2) on the date the bankruptcy petition was filed or order of relief granted, the debtor no longer owned the assets; and (3) the bankruptcy pleadings or statement of affairs do not reflect an adequate explanation for the disposition of the

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assets. [*In re Retz*, 606 F.3d 1189, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation and citation omitted).]

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The SAC's allegations paint a picture that, at first, appears to satisfy the foregoing standards. But the MSJ does not include uncontested facts that meet those standards.

and see In re Chalik, 748 F.2d 616, 619 (11th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted).

c. The SAC's allegations that appear to be most relevant to § 727(a)(5)

The SAC alleges:

- 36. In his bankruptcy schedules, MacMillan disclosed current or former ownership of the following entities and unincorporated businesses: ... Timeshare Relief, Inc. [aka Aston Marketing Group, Inc.] ... Attitude Marketing, Inc. ... (collectively, the "MacMillan Companies").
- 41. ... MacMillan, Martin and/or the MacMillan Companies acquired commercial real estate, multiple vacation properties, at least one airplane, luxury automobiles, race cars, business interests, and other property. The MacMillan/Martin enterprise has generated hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue. MacMillan and Martin have failed to account for almost all of this money in their substantively consolidated bankruptcy case. Moreover, MacMillan and Martin have produced few documents reflecting what happened to the hundreds of millions of dollars taken in by the MacMillan Companies.
 - On his website, davidmacmillantimeshare.com, MacMillan represented in a "Company Statement" dated March 31, 2015 and posted on September 17, 2015 that "[s]ince 2004, we have successfully facilitated the transfer or return to the Resorts of over 100,000 disgruntled timeshare owners who wanted out of their timeshares." At \$3,000 per deed/interest transferred, the MacMillan enterprise would have collected over \$300,000,000 in fees from victimized consumers from 2004 through 2015. Tax returns reflect that the gross revenue for Attitude Marketing was more than \$54 million in 2012 and more than \$26 million in 2013.
- 79. Timeshare Relief, Inc. ("<u>Timeshare Relief</u>") is perhaps the most notorious of the MacMillan Companies.
- 80. Timeshare Relief offered Timeshare Exit Services across the United States.
- 81. At various times, MacMillan and Martin were shareholders, officers and employees of Timeshare Relief.
- 92. On March 11, 2014, Timeshare Relief filed a Statement of Information in the Office of the Secretary of State of California in which MacMillan is listed as President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Timeshare Relief. Martin is listed as Secretary of Timeshare Relief. MacMillan and Martin represent that they are the sole Directors of Timeshare Relief. ...
- 94. <u>Despite demand by WVR in these bankruptcy cases and adversary proceedings, MacMillan and Martin have produced nearly no corporate books and records for Timeshare Relief.</u>
- 95. Notwithstanding the fact that she was President and Secretary of Timeshare Relief for years, Martin could not testify as to the occurrence of any shareholder meetings, meetings of the board of directors, the existence of a corporate book identifying issuance or transfer of shares in Timeshare Relief, any corporate resolutions or provide any meaningful details concerning books and records normally maintained by an entity which had the level of business activity of Timeshare Relief. (According to its 2012 tax return, Timeshare Relief generated gross revenue of \$54 million.).

- 156. The Timeshare Relief Owner Database, which was transferred to Attitude Marketing, was subsequently transferred to Aston Business Solutions.
- 157. Aston Business Solutions still uses the timeshare owner database to generate money from companies that offer Timeshare Exit Services to owners, including Wyndham owners.
- 158. Timeshare Relief developed and maintained a timeshare owner database with information about more than eight (8) million owners of timeshare interests (the "Owner Database").
- 161. Sometime before August of 2013, Attitude Marketing purportedly "acquired" the Owner Database and, in August of 2013, Attitude Marketing "transferred" the Owner Database to Aston Business Solutions.
- 162. After the transfer, the gross revenue of Attitude Marketing (owned by MacMillan and Martin) plummeted,⁸ while the fortunes of Aston Business Solutions (supposedly owned by Martin's daughter) skyrocketed.⁹
 - ⁸ In 2014 Attitude Marketing's gross revenue was \$2,196,546; in 2015 Attitude Marketing's gross revenue was \$1,057,862; in 2016 Attitude Marketing's gross revenue was \$1,165,698.
 - ⁹ Per its tax returns, Aston Business Solutions generated more than \$10.4 million in 2015, more than \$8 million in 2016, and more than \$3.5 million in 2017. <u>A great deal of the funds generated by Aston Business Solutions were funneled to MacMillan and Martin through Attitude Marketing</u>.
- 173. After entry of the Settlement Agreement [between MacMillan, some of Debtors' businesses, and Wyndham], Aston Business Solutions was a "client" of Attitude Marketing.
- 174. Aston Business Solutions provided nearly all of the income received by Attitude Marketing since the Debtors filed bankruptcy.
- 181. After entry of the Settlement Agreement, Aston Business Solutions' clients were referred to it by MacMillan. [SAC (adv. dkt. 151) (emphasis added)]

d. The MSJ's argument regarding § 727(a)(5)

The MSJ's argument regarding § 727(a)(5) is brief. It asserts:

Pursuant to financial records that have been uncovered by [Wyndham] through discovery, <u>Debtors generated millions of dollars every year in revenue through their myriad of businesses and DBAs</u>, yet the Debtors have <u>failed to satisfactorily explain</u> their loss and deficiency of assets to meet their liabilities. In short, the Debtors' business have generated hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue but MacMillan and Martin come to this Court supposedly penniless and without explanation for what happened to their ill-gotten gains. ...

Evidence has shown that MacMillan and Martin's net worth was substantial. However, the hundreds of millions generated by the MacMillan Companies has somehow simply evaporated. [Adv. dkt. 98, pp. 16:16-17:5 (emphasis added)]

This argument is insufficient for two alternative reasons.

(i) Wyndham's assertion that Debtors failed to "explain" a loss or deficiency of assets assumes, without evidence, that Debtors were <u>asked</u> for an explanation

There is insufficient evidence that Debtors were ever asked to explain their loss or deficiency of these alleged assets. A declaration in support of the MSJ does include some discovery requests (adv. dkt. 100, Ex. 10, at PDF pp. 25-40), but there is no copy of any response to that request. More broadly, there is no evidence to support the SAC's assertion that Debtors have "produced nearly no" records in response to discovery requests SAC (adv. dkt. 151, ¶ 94), and in any event that allegation in the SAC is not included in the MSJ.

Nor does Wyndham point to any question on Debtors' bankruptcy schedules or Statement Of Financial Affairs ("SOFA") that required Debtors to explain these alleged losses. This Bankruptcy Court recognizes that the SOFA includes questions about past income and loss of assets; but those questions have limitations, such as how far back Debtors must answer, and to what extent Debtors must provide information about their businesses, as distinguished from their own financial affairs. Without reference to specific questions that Debtors should have answered differently, there is no basis for summary judgment under § 727(a)(5).

(ii) Alternatively, the MSJ does not sufficiently identify exactly what "loss" or "deficiency" of assets Debtors are accused of not explaining

The MSJ, as quoted above, alleges that Debtors' businesses and DBAs generated millions of dollars in income and that the proceeds "somehow simply evaporated." MSJ (adv. dkt. 98), pp. 16:16-17:5. But there is insufficient evidence of the <u>specific</u> proceeds at issue.

Debtors do not dispute that they and their companies used to earn substantial revenues. But they explain that a prepetition settlement with Wyndham forced them

and "various entities" to stop providing services to their traditional customer base – timeshare owners – while allegedly permitting them to engage in marketing services to third parties under certain conditions. MacMillan Decl. (adv. dkt. 112), p. 3:12-16. This caused "financial distress" and by the time Debtors were in bankruptcy the businesses "were not fully staffed." *Id.* at p. 5:5-6.

True, Debtors' explanation is vague, and they offer no documentary support for that defense, but that is putting the cart before the horse. First Wyndham's MSJ has to produce evidence that Debtors had specific assets such as revenues from specific businesses prepetition, and that there is an unexplained loss or deficiency of those assets. Wyndham does not do so.

Wyndham's statement of undisputed facts ("Statement") does not address most of the alleged "myriad of businesses and DBAs" referenced in the MSJ. For example, although the SAC devotes substantial attention to Timeshare Relief, Aston Business Solutions, and what happened to the Owner Database, Wyndham's evidence in support of the MSJ does not address any of these things. Instead it includes a single reference to a single business, Attitude Marketing:

20. Tax returns reflect that the gross revenue for Attitude Marketing was more than \$54 million in 2012 and more than \$26 million in 2013. <u>Decl. D. Eliades, Exh. 3</u>; Attitude Marketing Tax Returns for the years 2012 and 2013. [Statement (adv. dkt. 99), p. 5:16-19 (emphasis added)]

But the declaration of Mr. Eliades in support of the MSJ (adv. dkt. 100) does not include any of the referenced tax returns. In actuality, although the Statement itself does not explain that it is referring to a <u>different declaration</u> of Mr. Eliades, the MSJ (adv. dkt. 98, p. 2:5-6) defines the "Eliades Declaration" as a declaration filed in the main bankruptcy case – not in this adversary proceeding. That different declaration and exhibits start on page 73 of Wyndham's response to Debtors' objection to Wyndham's claim (the "Claim Objection Opposition," MacMillan Bankruptcy, dkt. 326).

Debtors apparently were confused by this indirect reference to a different declaration than the one accompanying the MSJ. On several factual issues they object,

"the cited evidence does not exist as cited." Evid. Obj. (adv. dkt. 113) p. 2, at lines 8, 13, 18, 22.

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But even assuming, for the sake of discussion, that Debtors should have realized which declaration was being referenced, the 2012 and 2013 tax returns of Attitude Marketing are not enough. That evidence of past income of a single business does nothing to undercut Debtors' explanation that Wyndham itself caused the loss of their business' income, through the prepetition settlement that restricted what Debtors and their businesses could do.

For each of the foregoing reasons, this Court cannot grant summary judgment under § 727(a)(5).

e. § 727(a)(4)

§ 727(a)(4) provides:

- (a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless—
- (4) the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case—
 - (A) made a false oath or account;
 - (B) presented or used a false claim;
 - (C) gave, offered, received, or attempted to obtain money, property, or advantage, or a promise of money, property, or advantage, for acting or forbearing to act; or
 - (D) withheld from an officer of the estate entitled to possession under this title, any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to the debtor's property or financial affairs [§ 727(a)(4) (emphasis added)]

Wyndham's MSJ focuses on the emphasized language above. The MSJ identifies several separate allegedly false oaths or accounts.

(i) Equity interests in Attitude Marketing

The MSJ states:

Martin represented in her bankruptcy schedules that she had an ownership interest in Attitude Marketing. Post-petition, however, Martin unequivocally testified under oath that she did not have an ownership interest in Attitude Marketing at the time of her bankruptcy filing. [MSJ (adv. dkt. 98), p. 6:19-22.]

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But Martin explains that a "memo on [a \$10,615.57] check was erroneous" in stating that it was issued on account of an equity interest (Martin Decl., adv. dkt. 112, p. 2:8-14), and the reasonable inference is that Martin was confused, but attempting to be fully candid, when she checked the box on her bankruptcy schedules indicating that that she had an interest in an "undetermined" amount in Attitude Marketing. MSJ (adv. dkt. 98) p. 6, n. 5, at lines 24-26. Martin now declares: "I was not, nor have I ever been an owner, or an owner of equity in Attitude Marketing, Inc." Martin Decl. (adv. dkt. 112), p. 2:13-14.

In a summary judgment context, this Court cannot assess credibility. In any event there is no evidence from which to question Martin's explanation.

(ii) Nevada litigation

Wyndham accuses Debtors of knowingly and fraudulently failing to disclose some litigation (the "Nevada National" litigation). MSJ (adv. dkt. 98), pp. 12:21-14:3. But MacMillan declares:

With regard to the Nevada National litigation, this matter was a frivolous lawsuit filed against Attitude Marketing, Aston Business Solutions, Cynthia Martin and myself. The case was quickly settled in mediation, before the bankruptcy, neither Cyndy Martin or myself or Attitude Marketing received anything out of it. I[t] was simply an oversight not to list it. [MacMillan Decl. (adv. dkt. 112), p. 6:14-17]

Again, on summary judgment this Court cannot assess credibility. In addition, given the dozens of businesses and DBAs of Debtors, and the number of disputes and lawsuits they appear to have had, there is no evidence from which to question Debtors' explanation that omitting this one piece of minor litigation was simply an oversight.

(iii) Whether clients of Debtors' businesses must be treated as Debtors' own creditors

Wyndham accuses Debtors of knowingly and fraudulently failing to list on their creditor matrix and bankruptcy schedules "thousands of creditors" – namely, timeshare owners who allegedly are "actual or potential creditors" of Debtors. MSJ (adv. dkt. 98), p. 14:4-17 *et seq.* Wyndham notes in particular certain of its own timeshare owners

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who had involvement with Debtors or their businesses. But Debtors have argued that the timeshare owners were clients of Debtors' businesses, not Debtors themselves. As MacMillan explains:

- 15. I listed all consumers that I knew who were making claims against me on my bankruptcy schedules. I believe it was in my best interest to list all potential claimants. In addition, I had no way of knowing who made the complaints [to governmental entities about Debtors' businesses]. The complaints that were known about were listed on the schedules.
- 16. With regard to the timeshare owners who remitted payments directly to Wyndham, such as money orders or personal checks made payable to Wyndham in 2016 and 2017 to have their timeshares transferred, I did not list those owners as creditors on my bankruptcy schedules as they were not creditors. They were Wyndham clients and we were in the process of actively working with Wyndham to return these timeshares pursuant to the settlement agreement. As such at that time, I did not deem them to be creditors because I was simply facilitating the transfer of the timeshares back to the developer and was trying to complete a job. Our company in conjunction with Wyndham contacted the owners to let them know that Wyndham would be taking the properties/timeshares back. Included as part of the settlement agreement with Wyndham was a letter from Wyndham (see settlement agreement ¶5) that was sent to all Wyndham owners of the master list that read "Wyndham will accept a return of your Wyndham timeshare interest if you execute the enclosed documents".

18. I highly dispute the statement that "9000 consumers paid the MacMillan entities to transfer the time shares and those interests were not transferred". The vast majority of timeshares were transferred. Every effort was made to complete every transfer that the company had knowledge of. The 9,000 number is hearsay and highly inflated. [MacMillan Decl. (adv. dkt. 112), pp. 6:18-7:18]

In other words, Debtors did not list their business's customers as their own. That appears to be a reasonable explanation.

True, the SAC summarizes assertions in some prior litigation that Debtors are alter egos of their businesses. But Debtors claim they attempted to list anyone who was actually asserting liability against them and, as Debtors point out, it would be in their own interests to do so, in order to discharge those debts.

Wyndham cites no authority that Debtors had a duty to treat <u>allegations</u> of alter ego liability in <u>other</u> matters as if they transformed every claim against Debtors'

businesses into claims against Debtors themselves. On the record presented, this Court cannot conclude that Debtors' "knowingly and fraudulently" failed to list creditors.

For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court cannot grant summary judgment under § 727(a)(4).

f. § 727(a)(6)

§ 727(a)(6) provides:

- (a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless—
- (6) the debtor has refused, in the case—
 - (A) to obey any lawful order of the court, other than an order to respond to a material question or to testify;
 - (B) on the ground of privilege against self-incrimination, to respond to a material question approved by the court or to testify, after the debtor has been granted immunity with respect to the matter concerning which such privilege was invoked; or
 - (C) on a ground other than the properly invoked privilege against self-incrimination, to respond to a material question approved by the court or to testify [§ 727(a)(6) (emphasis added)]

The MSJ asserts that Debtor MacMillan refused to obey this Court's order, in the form of a subpoena to produce certain records of Timeshare, and instead destroying those documents "less than three weeks" after those documents were required to be produced. MSJ (adv. dkt. 98), p. 9:15-28. But, as explained in the Interim Memdispo:

Debtor MacMillan declares that the documents were destroyed because "[w]e had occupied the building since 2005," they had an "accumulation of paperwork in the ordinary business," and they had to vacate the premises at the end of 2016 due to a foreclosure. MacMillan Decl. (Wynd-Mac-Adv.dkt. 112), p. 5:17-26. He adds that he "believed the best course of action at the time was to properly dispose of redundant and irrelevant paperwork" and that none of these actions "affected any of the financial disclosures." *Id.* [Interim Memdispo (adv. dkt. 144, p. 7:1-8)]

As noted in the Interim Memdispo, "the parties' allegations raise credibility issues, that cannot be decided on summary judgment. Wyndham has not established the lack of a genuine dispute as to these factual allegations." Interim Memdispo (adv. dkt. 144, p. 7:8-10.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court cannot grant summary judgment under § 727(a)(6).

3. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the MSJ's claims for relief under § 727(a)(4), (5) and (6) must be denied. Together with the Interim Memdispo, this resolves all claims in the MSJ.

Debtors are directed to lodge a proposed order denying these remaining claims in the MSJ within seven days after entry of this Memorandum Decision on the docket.

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Date: April 9, 2020

Neil W. Bason

United States Bankruptcy Judge