

1 [Amended] Objections to Debtor Valley Health System’s Motion for OSC Re: Civil Contempt,
2 and Valley Health System’s reply,² the court will dispense with oral argument and a hearing and
3 deny the Motion without prejudice based on the following findings of fact and conclusions of
4 law made pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(1), as incorporated into FRBP 7052 and applied to
5 contested matters by FRBP 9014(c).

6 By its Motion, Valley Health System (“VHS”) seeks issuance of an order to show cause
7 (“OSC”) pursuant to LBR 9020-1(a), which states:

8 Unless otherwise ordered by the court, contempt proceedings are initiated by
9 filing a motion that conforms to LBR 9013-1 and a proposed order to show cause.
10 Cause must be shown by filing a written explanation why the party should not be
held in contempt and by appearing at the hearing.”

11 The proposed order must clearly identify the allegedly contemptuous conduct, the sanctions
12 sought, and the grounds for such sanctions. LBR 9020-1(c)(2). The target of the OSC must be
13 served with the motion and given an opportunity to object to issuance of the OSC. LBR 9020-
14 1(b).

15 “Contempt proceedings are the traditional method for addressing a violation of the
16 discharge injunction.” Bassett v. Am. Gen. Fin. Inc. (In re Bassett), 255 B.R. 747, 755 (9th Cir.
17 BAP 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 285 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2002); see
18 Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 230 F.3d 439, 445 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[A] bankruptcy court is
19 authorized to invoke section 105 to enforce the discharge injunction . . .”). “A party that
20 knowingly violates the discharge injunction can be held in contempt under § 105(a).” Nash v.
21 Clark Co. Dist. Attorney’s Office (In re Nash), 464 B.R. 874, 880 (9th Cir. BAP 2012); see
22 Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193, 1205 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 559
23 U.S. 260 (2010). The violation must be willful. Jarvar v. Title Cash of Mont., Inc. (In re Jarvar),
24 422 B.R. 242, 250 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2009) (“Willful violation of the § 524(a)(2) injunction
25 warrants the finding of contempt”).
26
27

28 ² Valley Health System’s Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of David P. Sanders,
Objections 1-7 are sustained.

1 “To prove that a sanctionable violation of the discharge injunction has occurred, the
2 debtor must show that the creditor: ‘(1) knew the discharge injunction was applicable and (2)
3 intended the actions which violated the injunction.’” Nash, 464 B.R. at 880 (quoting Espinosa,
4 553 F.3d at 1205 n.7). “The courts have employed an objective test in determining whether an
5 injunction should be enforced via the contempt power.” Bassett, 255 B.R. at 758. “In
6 determining whether the contemnor violated the stay, the focus ‘is not on the subjective beliefs
7 or intent of the contemnors in complying with the order, but whether in fact their conduct
8 complied with the order at issue.’” Lindblade v. Knupfer (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1191 (9th
9 Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “In other words, a creditor may not hide its eyes to the discharge
10 injunction to avoid its reach.” Dickerson, 510 B.R. at 303. “A party’s negligence or absence of
11 intent to violate the discharge order is not a defense against a motion for contempt.” Jarvar, 422
12 B.R. at 250.

13 The moving party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the offending party
14 violated the discharge order and that sanctions are justified. Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1205 n.7;
15 Nash, 464 B.R. at 880. If adequate proof is produced, the burden then shifts to the offending
16 party to demonstrate why it was unable to comply with the discharge injunction. See Renwick v.
17 Bennett (In re Bennett), 298 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002); F.T.C. v. Affordable Media, 179
18 F.3d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999); Dickerson, 510 B.R. at 298. The bankruptcy court has broad
19 discretion in fashioning a remedy for violation of the discharge injunction. Bassett, 255 B.R. at
20 758. If the court finds a willful violation of the discharge injunction, the court may award actual
21 damages, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and costs to the debtor. See Espinosa, 553 F.3d at
22 1205 n.7; Nash, 464 B.R. at 880.

23 Courts must scrutinize ex parte motions seeking the issuance of an OSC re contempt. See
24 Costa v. Welch (In re Costa), 172 B.R. 954, 963 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994) (“Courts should be
25 cautious when authorizing contempt proceedings. Orders to show cause should not issue merely
26 because someone requests one.”). “Obtaining an order to show cause requires a demonstration
27 of facts that, if not rebutted, could be sufficient to warrant an order of contempt.” Id. As the
28 court explained in Costa:

1 Contempt is serious business that nobody takes lightly. The mere existence of an
2 order to show cause suggests that the court has made a preliminary determination
3 that an order of contempt is a realistic possibility. When issued based on
4 allegations that are unlikely to warrant an order of contempt, the order to show
cause smacks of bullying and creates perceptions that call the court's impartiality
into question.

5 Id. at 963-64.

6 In this case, VHS seeks an order directing Respondents Gregory G. Petersen, Peggy
7 Kirton, and Diana Agnello to appear and show cause why they should not be held in contempt
8 for allegedly violating the discharge injunction contained in this court's Order (i) Confirming
9 First Amended Plan for Adjustment of Debts of Valley Health System Dated December 17,
10 2009, As Modified February 19, 2010, and (ii) Granting Judgment For Valley Health System In
11 Each Challenge Action ("Confirmation Order") entered on April 26, 2010, by Respondents'
12 commencement and prosecution of each of the following lawsuits to assert claims based upon or
13 arising out of the Valley Health System Retirement Plan Adopted January 1, 1971, as amended
14 ("VHS Retirement Plan"):

15 Case No. RIC 10017129, styled Kirton v. Valley Health System, et al., filed in the
16 Superior Court of California, County of Riverside, on August 26, 2010, removed
17 to this court on September 22, 2010, and assigned Adversary No. 6:10-ap-01566-
PC ("Kirton").

18 Case No. RIC 120152, Reichardt, et al. v. Valley Health System, et al., filed in the
19 Superior Court of California, County of Riverside, on January 25, 2012, removed
20 to this court on January 27, 2012, and assigned Adversary No. 6:12-ap-01032-PC
("Reichardt I").

21 Case No. RIC 1406794, styled Reichardt, et al. v. The Valley Health System
22 Retirement Plan, et al., filed in the Superior Court of California, County of
23 Riverside ("Reichardt II") on July 18, 2014, removed to this court on September
10, 2014, and assigned Adversary No. 6:14-ap-01236-PC ("Reichardt II").

24 VHS further seeks an order requiring Respondents "to cease prosecuting any and all currently
25 pending litigation against VHS or the [VHS Retirement Plan] and prohibiting [Respondents]
26 from commencing any litigation, including but not limited to lawsuits, adversary proceedings,
27
28

1 petitions for mandamus, or administrative proceedings against VHS or the VHS Retirement
2 Plan,”³ together with an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

3 Respondents, Kirton and Agnello are the plaintiffs in Kirton, and Respondent, Gregory
4 G. Petersen is their attorney. VHS asserts that Respondents “(1) knew there was a Discharge
5 Injunction applicable to their claims, and (2) despite such knowledge, intended to and did
6 prosecute lawsuits that directly violated the Discharge Injunction.”⁴ As evidence of knowledge
7 and intent, VHS points to this court’s Memorandum Decision entered in Kirton on February 24,
8 2011, which included, among other findings of fact and conclusions of law, the following
9 findings in support of its order denying Kirton’s motion for reconsideration of an order
10 dismissing Kirton under F.R.Civ.P 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim:

- 11 1. Kirton received notice of VHS’s bankruptcy and the deadline of August 25,
12 2008, within which to file proofs of claim.
- 13 2. Kirton did not object to confirmation of VHS’s plan.
- 14 3. When the sale closed on October 13, 2010, VHS’s confirmed plan of
15 adjustment became effective and binding upon all parties in interest, including
16 Kirton.
- 17 4. VHS was then [when the Plan became effective] discharged from its prepetition
18 obligations to Kirton based upon or arising out of the VHS Retirement Plan.
- 19 5. Kirton was enjoined from enforcing such obligations except as provided by the
20 confirmed plan.⁵

21 Respondents, however, disagreed with the court’s decision. On appeal, the United States
22 Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed. Kirton v. Valley Health
23 Sys. (In re Valley Health Sys.), 2015 WL 777685, *7 (9th Cir. BAP 2015). But on March 26,
24 2015, Respondents appealed to the Ninth Circuit where it is currently pending under Case No.
25 15-60023.

26 ³ Motion, Exh. 1, 2:25-3:5.

27 ⁴ Id. at 12:4-6.

28 ⁵ Id. at 12:9-19 (emphasis added by VHS).

1 Kirton, Reichardt I, and Reichardt II each involve claims by Defined Benefit Plan
2 Participants⁶ against VHS and/or the VHS Retirement Plan, Metropolitan Life Insurance
3 Company (“MetLife”), as administrator of the VHS Retirement Plan, and one or more of the
4 Plan Trustees,⁷ seeking damages and other relief for an alleged underfunding of the VHS
5 Retirement Plan based upon various theories of recovery, including fraud, breach of contract, and
6 breach of fiduciary duty. In Kirton, the court dismissed the claims asserted in the Kirton
7 complaint without leave to amend reasoning that: (1) on the petition date, VHS’s only funding
8 obligation with respect to the VHS Retirement Plan arose from its prepetition contractual
9 obligations under the plan; (2) the Plan Trustees had no contractual obligations under the VHS
10 Retirement Plan in their individual capacities; (3) the VHS Chapter 9 Plan and Confirmation
11 Order discharged VHS from its prepetition obligations to the Defined Benefit Plan Participants,
12 including Kirton, based upon or arising out of the VHS Retirement Plan; (4) MetLife, as
13 administrator of the VHS Retirement Plan, was in an identical position as VHS and the Plan
14 Trustees with respect to Kirton’s claims as a Defined Benefit Plan Participant; and (5) Kirton’s
15 claims against MetLife were integrally related to those asserted against VHS and the Plan
16 Trustees. Whether this court’s findings were correct will be determined by the Ninth Circuit.

17 Respondents argue that the claims made the basis of Kirton, Reichardt I and Reichardt II
18 are distinct and separate, but the court believes there are fundamental issues common to Kirton,
19 Reichardt I and Reichardt II that a final determination by the Ninth Circuit in Kirton will
20 ultimately control. Accordingly, the court has stayed further action in Reichardt I and Reichardt
21 II pending final adjudication by the Ninth Circuit of the substantive issues on appeal in Kirton.

22
23
24 ⁶ “Defined Benefit Plan Participants” are defined in Section I.A.(22) of the First Amended Plan
25 for the Adjustment of Debts of Valley Health System Dated December 17, 2009 (as modified)
26 (“VHS Chapter 9 Plan”) as “participants in the VHS Retirement Plan.”

27 ⁷ The complaints in Kirton, Reichardt I, and Reichardt II each assert claims against one or more
28 of the following persons, individually and in their capacity as a trustee of the VHS Retirement
Plan: Geoffrey Lang, Lloyd Dunn, Myron Grindheim, Patricia Tuller, William Blasé, William
Cherry, Glenn Holmes, Madeleine Dreier, Vinay M. Rao, Amelia Hippert, Tom F. Wilson, Dean
Deines, Joel Bergenfeld, and Michele Byrd (collectively, the “Plan Trustees”)

